11 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 6809 | Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird] |
| 12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 4366 | We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |