13 ideas
| 12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
| 12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
| 12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
| 12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
| 12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
| 6809 | Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird] |
| 12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |
| 10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
| 6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
| 6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
| 6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
| 6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
| 6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |