17 ideas
| 12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
| 15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
| 15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
| 15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
| 12184 | Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge] |
| 15083 | The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale] |
| 15084 | In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale] |
| 12180 | Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge] |
| 12181 | Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge] |
| 12183 | It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge] |
| 12192 | The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge] |
| 12182 | We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge] |
| 12187 | Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge] |
| 12186 | Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge] |
| 6809 | Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird] |
| 12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |
| 15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |