102 ideas
| 4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
| 4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
| 4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
| 4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
| 16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
| 16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
| 16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
| 2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
| 16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
| 16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
| 16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
| 16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
| 16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
| 4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
| 4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
| 16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
| 4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
| 4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
| 4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
| 4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
| 4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
| 4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
| 4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
| 4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
| 4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
| 4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
| 4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
| 4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
| 4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
| 4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
| 4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
| 4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
| 4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
| 4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
| 4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
| 4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
| 4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
| 4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
| 4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
| 4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
| 4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
| 4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
| 4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
| 4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
| 4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
| 4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
| 4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
| 16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
| 4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
| 4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
| 4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
| 4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
| 4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
| 4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
| 4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
| 4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
| 4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
| 4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
| 4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
| 16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
| 16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
| 4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
| 4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
| 4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
| 4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
| 4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
| 4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
| 4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
| 4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
| 4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
| 4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
| 4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
| 4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
| 4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
| 4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
| 4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
| 4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
| 4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
| 4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
| 4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
| 4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
| 16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |
| 4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
| 4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
| 4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
| 4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
| 4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
| 4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
| 4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
| 4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
| 14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
| 4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
| 4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
| 4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
| 4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |