58 ideas
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
12314 | Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford] |
12313 | Explanation is for curiosity, control, understanding, to make meaningful, or to give authority [Stanford] |
12315 | We can explain by showing constitution, as well as showing causes [Stanford] |
4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
20712 | God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B] |
20701 | Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B] |
20702 | The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B] |
20703 | How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B] |
20694 | 'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B] |
4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
20706 | A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B] |
20707 | The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B] |
20708 | If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B] |
20710 | Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B] |
20711 | A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B] |
20709 | The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B] |
20697 | One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B] |
20699 | Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B] |