91 ideas
| 23183 | Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system [Nietzsche] |
| 23188 | Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche] |
| 23212 | A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche] |
| 23199 | What is the search for truth if it isn't moral? [Nietzsche] |
| 23202 | Like all philosophers, I love truth [Nietzsche] |
| 9572 | Realists about sets say there exists a null set in the real world, with no members [Chihara] |
| 9550 | We only know relational facts about the empty set, but nothing intrinsic [Chihara] |
| 9562 | In simple type theory there is a hierarchy of null sets [Chihara] |
| 9573 | The null set is a structural position which has no other position in membership relation [Chihara] |
| 9551 | What is special about Bill Clinton's unit set, in comparison with all the others? [Chihara] |
| 9549 | The set theorist cannot tell us what 'membership' is [Chihara] |
| 9571 | ZFU refers to the physical world, when it talks of 'urelements' [Chihara] |
| 9563 | A pack of wolves doesn't cease when one member dies [Chihara] |
| 23196 | Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche] |
| 9561 | The mathematics of relations is entirely covered by ordered pairs [Chihara] |
| 4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
| 9552 | Sentences are consistent if they can all be true; for Frege it is that no contradiction can be deduced [Chihara] |
| 23186 | Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting [Nietzsche] |
| 9553 | Analytic geometry gave space a mathematical structure, which could then have axioms [Chihara] |
| 10192 | We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride] |
| 23211 | Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances [Nietzsche] |
| 4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
| 4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
| 9559 | If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara] |
| 9566 | No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara] |
| 4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
| 4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
| 4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
| 4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
| 4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
| 4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
| 4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
| 23201 | The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche] |
| 23207 | Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche] |
| 4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
| 4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
| 4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
| 4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
| 4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
| 4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
| 4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
| 23197 | Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche] |
| 23206 | Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche] |
| 4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
| 23209 | Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche] |
| 23184 | The mind is a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche] |
| 4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
| 23190 | Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche] |
| 4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
| 4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
| 23191 | Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche] |
| 23213 | The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation [Nietzsche] |
| 23210 | That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled [Nietzsche] |
| 4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
| 4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
| 4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
| 4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
| 4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
| 4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
| 4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
| 4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
| 4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
| 4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
| 4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
| 4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
| 23189 | Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche] |
| 23192 | Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche] |
| 23187 | Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful [Nietzsche] |
| 9568 | I prefer the open sentences of a Constructibility Theory, to Platonist ideas of 'equivalence classes' [Chihara] |
| 9547 | Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara] |
| 23205 | Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche] |
| 23198 | Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience [Nietzsche] |
| 23208 | Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice [Nietzsche] |
| 23193 | Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion [Nietzsche] |
| 23214 | For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings! [Nietzsche] |
| 23203 | The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole [Nietzsche] |
| 23200 | The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors [Nietzsche] |
| 23194 | People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history [Nietzsche] |
| 23204 | To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy [Nietzsche] |
| 4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
| 4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
| 23195 | Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations [Nietzsche] |
| 9574 | 'Gunk' is an individual possessing no parts that are atoms [Chihara] |
| 23185 | In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances [Nietzsche] |
| 4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |