124 ideas
11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |