84 ideas
| 4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
| 4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
| 4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
| 4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
| 4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
| 4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
| 4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
| 4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
| 4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
| 4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
| 4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
| 4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
| 4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
| 4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
| 4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
| 4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
| 4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
| 23101 | Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes] |
| 4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
| 4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
| 4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
| 4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
| 4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
| 4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
| 4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
| 4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
| 4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
| 4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
| 4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
| 4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
| 4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
| 4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
| 4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
| 4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
| 23086 | Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes] |
| 23100 | Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes] |
| 20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
| 20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
| 20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
| 20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
| 23087 | Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes] |
| 23089 | Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes] |
| 23093 | Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes] |
| 23098 | Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes] |
| 23094 | Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23095 | Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes] |
| 23096 | Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes] |
| 23090 | Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes] |
| 23117 | Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes] |
| 23119 | Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes] |
| 23088 | Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes] |
| 23097 | What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes] |
| 23099 | It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes] |
| 23118 | Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes] |
| 23109 | The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes] |
| 23114 | The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes] |
| 23116 | Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes] |
| 23103 | Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes] |
| 23107 | Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes] |
| 23081 | Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23085 | The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23092 | Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23102 | Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes] |
| 23084 | Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes] |
| 23079 | Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes] |
| 23091 | Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes] |
| 23112 | Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes] |
| 23082 | Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes] |
| 23106 | To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes] |
| 23121 | It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes] |
| 23105 | It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes] |
| 23120 | The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes] |
| 23108 | Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes] |
| 23083 | Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes] |
| 23113 | Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes] |
| 4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
| 4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
| 4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |