59 ideas
7973 | There is no longer anything on which there is nothing to say [Baudrillard] |
7975 | The task of philosophy is to unmask the illusion of objective reality [Baudrillard] |
7986 | Drunken boat pilots are less likely to collide than clearly focused ones [Baudrillard] |
7982 | Instead of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis, they now cancel out, and the conflict is levelled [Baudrillard] |
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
7974 | Without God we faced reality: what do we face without reality? [Baudrillard] |
7987 | Nothing is true, but everything is exact [Baudrillard] |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
7978 | There is no need to involve the idea of free will to make choices about one's life [Baudrillard] |
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
7980 | In modern times, being useless is the essential aesthetic ingredient for an object [Baudrillard] |
5121 | Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman] |
5120 | What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman] |
7983 | Good versus evil has been banefully reduced to happiness versus misfortune [Baudrillard] |
7981 | Whole populations are terrorist threats to authorities, who unite against them [Baudrillard] |
7976 | People like democracy because it means they can avoid power [Baudrillard] |
7977 | Only in the last 200 years have people demanded the democratic privilege of being individuals [Baudrillard] |
7979 | The arrival of the news media brought history to an end [Baudrillard] |
7984 | Suicide is ascribed to depression, with the originality of the act of will ignored [Baudrillard] |
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
7985 | Pascal says secular life is acceptable, but more fun with the hypothesis of God [Baudrillard] |