Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Elements of Mind', 'Ethics without Principles' and 'Timaeus'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


69 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
For relaxation one can consider the world of change, instead of eternal things [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Philosophy is the supreme gift of the gods to mortals [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato]
The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane]
If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties are causes [Crane]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas]
Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato]
In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato]
For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane]
Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane]
The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane]
The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Only bird-brained people think astronomy is entirely a matter of evidence [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Plato says the soul is ordered by number [Plato, by Plutarch]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane]
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
No one wants to be bad, but bad men result from physical and educational failures, which they do not want or choose [Plato]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane]
Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music has harmony like the soul, and serves to reorder disharmony within us [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Dancy,J, by Orsi]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
One should exercise both the mind and the body, to avoid imbalance [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Intelligence is the result of rational teaching; true opinion can result from irrational persuasion [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Bad governments prevent discussion, and discourage the study of virtue [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The creator of the cosmos had no envy, and so wanted things to be as like himself as possible [Plato]
The cosmos must be unique, because it resembles the creator, who is unique [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
We must consider the four basic shapes as too small to see, only becoming visible in large numbers [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane]