78 ideas
21474 | Metaphysics studies the inexplicable ends of explanation [Schopenhauer] |
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
17867 | If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog] |
17877 | The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog] |
4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
21470 | For me the objective thing-in-itself is the will [Schopenhauer] |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
17872 | Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog] |
17871 | Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog] |
17866 | Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog] |
17868 | Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog] |
17870 | Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog] |
17869 | Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog] |
17876 | Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog] |
21479 | Knowledge is not power! Ignorant people possess supreme authority [Schopenhauer] |
4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
21476 | A priori propositions are those we could never be seriously motivated to challenge [Schopenhauer] |
4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
21473 | All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer] |
4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
21478 | Half our thinking is unconscious, and we reach conclusions while unaware of premises [Schopenhauer] |
4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
21477 | We don't control our own thinking [Schopenhauer] |
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
17873 | Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog] |
4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
21475 | All of our concepts are borrowed from perceptual knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
21372 | Aesthetics concerns how we can take pleasure in an object, with no reference to the will [Schopenhauer] |
21488 | The beautiful is a perception of Plato's Forms, which eliminates the will [Schopenhauer] |
21483 | Man is essentially a dreadful wild animal [Schopenhauer] |
21466 | Pleasure is weaker, and pain stronger, than we expect [Schopenhauer] |
21484 | A man's character can be learned from a single characteristic action [Schopenhauer] |
21482 | The five Chinese virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom, honesty [Schopenhauer] |
21481 | Buddhists wisely start with the cardinal vices [Schopenhauer] |
21480 | Boredom is only felt by those clever enough to need activity [Schopenhauer] |
21469 | Human life is a mistake, shown by boredom, which is direct awareness of the fact [Schopenhauer] |
21485 | The state only exists to defend citizens, from exterior threats, and from one another [Schopenhauer] |
21486 | Poverty and slavery are virtually two words for the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
21487 | The freedom of the press to sell poison outweighs its usefulness [Schopenhauer] |
21471 | If suicide was quick and easy, most people would have done it by now [Schopenhauer] |
21467 | Would humanity still exist if sex wasn't both desired and pleasurable? [Schopenhauer] |
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
17864 | Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog] |
17863 | Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog] |
4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
21472 | Only religion introduces serious issues to uneducated people [Schopenhauer] |
21468 | The Creator created the possibilities for worlds, so should have made a better one than this possible [Schopenhauer] |