68 ideas
162 | Can we understand an individual soul without knowing the soul in general? [Plato] |
160 | The highest ability in man is the ability to discuss unity and plurality in the nature of things [Plato] |
166 | A speaker should be able to divide a subject, right down to the limits of divisibility [Plato] |
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
7953 | Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato] |
16121 | I revere anyone who can discern a single thing that encompasses many things [Plato] |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
153 | It takes a person to understand, by using universals, and by using reason to create a unity out of sense-impressions [Plato] |
154 | We would have an overpowering love of knowledge if we had a pure idea of it - as with the other Forms [Plato] |
4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
151 | True knowledge is of the reality behind sense experience [Plato] |
4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
165 | If the apparent facts strongly conflict with probability, it is in everyone's interests to suppress the facts [Plato] |
22363 | You have only begun to do real science when you can express it in numbers [Kelvin] |
9296 | The soul is self-motion [Plato] |
4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
23997 | Plato saw emotions and appetites as wild horses, in need of taming [Plato, by Goldie] |
4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
158 | An excellent speech seems to imply a knowledge of the truth in the mind of the speaker [Plato] |
159 | Only a good philosopher can be a good speaker [Plato] |
5946 | 'Phaedrus' pioneers the notion of philosophical rhetoric [Lawson-Tancred on Plato] |
155 | Beauty is the clearest and most lovely of the Forms [Plato] |
143 | The two ruling human principles are the natural desire for pleasure, and an acquired love of virtue [Plato] |
157 | Most pleasure is release from pain, and is therefore not worthwhile [Plato] |
144 | Reason impels us towards excellence, which teaches us self-control [Plato] |
156 | Bad people are never really friends with one another [Plato] |
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
20644 | Energy has progressed from a mere formula, to a principle pervading all nature [Kelvin] |
148 | If the prime origin is destroyed, it will not come into being again out of anything [Plato] |
152 | The mind of God is fully satisfied and happy with a vision of reality and truth [Plato] |
4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
150 | We cannot conceive of God, so we have to think of Him as an immortal version of ourselves [Plato] |
149 | There isn't a single reason for positing the existence of immortal beings [Plato] |
146 | Soul is always in motion, so it must be self-moving and immortal [Plato] |