Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Elements of Mind', 'Sentences' and 'Democracy in America (abr Renshaw)'

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60 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane]
If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties are causes [Crane]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane]
Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane]
The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane]
The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane]
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane]
Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Wherever there is a small community, the association of the people is natural [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The people are just individuals, and only present themselves as united to foreigners [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
Vast empires are bad for well-being and freedom, though they may promote glory [Tocqueville]
People would be much happier and freer in small nations [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
In American judges rule according to the Constitution, not the law [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A monarchical family is always deeply concerned with the interests of the state [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Despots like to see their own regulations ignored, by themselves and their agents [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Aristocracy is constituted by inherited landed property [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
In Europe it is thought that local government is best handled centrally [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
An election, and its lead up time, are always a national crisis [Tocqueville]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
Universal suffrage is no guarantee of wise choices [Tocqueville]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery undermines the morals and energy of a society [Tocqueville]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
The liberty of the press is more valuable for what it prevents than what it promotes [Tocqueville]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
It is admirable to elevate the humble to the level of the great, but the opposite is depraved [Tocqueville]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Equality can only be established by equal rights for all (or no rights for anyone) [Tocqueville]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane]