86 ideas
| 8927 | Philosophy moves essentially in the element of universality [Hegel] |
| 21776 | Philosophy aims to reveal the necessity and rationality of the categories of nature and spirit [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 8935 | Without philosophy, science is barren and futile [Hegel] |
| 22082 | Truth does not appear by asserting reasons and then counter-reasons [Hegel] |
| 22035 | The structure of reason is a social and historical achievement [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 8932 | Truth does not come from giving reasons for and against propositions [Hegel] |
| 7077 | The true is the whole [Hegel] |
| 4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
| 21812 | Being is the product of pure intellect [Plotinus] |
| 21817 | The One does not exist, but is the source of all existence [Plotinus] |
| 21824 | The One is a principle which transcends Being [Plotinus] |
| 21813 | Number determines individual being [Plotinus] |
| 4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
| 4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
| 4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
| 4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
| 4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
| 4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
| 4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
| 4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
| 4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
| 15611 | I develop philosophical science from the simplest appearance of immediate consciousness [Hegel, by Hegel] |
| 8928 | The Absolute is not supposed to be comprehended, but felt and intuited [Hegel] |
| 8929 | In the Absolute everything is the same [Hegel] |
| 21774 | Genuine idealism is seeing the ideal structure of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 8934 | Being is Thought [Hegel] |
| 21773 | Experience is immediacy, unity, forces, self-awareness, reason, culture, absolute being [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
| 4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
| 4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
| 4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
| 4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
| 22033 | Hegel tried to avoid Kant's dualism of neutral intuitions and imposed concepts [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
| 4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
| 21771 | Consciousness derives its criterion of knowledge from direct knowledge of its own being [Hegel] |
| 4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
| 5506 | If soul was like body, its parts would be separate, without communication [Plotinus] |
| 20741 | Consciousness is shaped dialectically, by opposing forces and concepts [Hegel, by Aho] |
| 21770 | Consciousness is both of objects, and of itself [Hegel] |
| 4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
| 21827 | The movement of Soul is continuous, but we are only aware of the parts of it that are sensed [Plotinus] |
| 4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
| 4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
| 5647 | Hegel claims knowledge of self presupposes desire, and hence objects [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 21828 | A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus] |
| 5648 | For Hegel knowledge of self presupposes objects, and also a public and moral social world [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 21809 | Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus] |
| 21825 | The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus] |
| 4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
| 4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
| 4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
| 4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
| 4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
| 4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
| 4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
| 4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
| 4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
| 4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
| 4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
| 4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
| 21826 | The Soul reasons about the Right, so there must be some permanent Right about which it reasons [Plotinus] |
| 6922 | Ecstasy is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man [Plotinus, by Feuerbach] |
| 8930 | The in-itself must become for-itself, which requires self-consciousness [Hegel] |
| 8936 | Human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds [Hegel] |
| 22034 | Modern life needs individuality, but must recognise that human agency is social [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 21987 | History is the progress of the consciousness of freedom [Hegel] |
| 21816 | Soul is the logos of Nous, just as Nous is the logos of the One [Plotinus] |
| 21815 | Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus] |
| 21814 | How can multiple existence arise from the unified One? [Plotinus] |
| 4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
| 4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
| 8931 | The movement of pure essences constitutes the nature of scientific method [Hegel] |
| 8933 | Science confronts the inner necessities of objects [Hegel] |
| 21775 | The God of revealed religion can only be understood through pure speculative knowledge [Hegel] |
| 4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
| 21808 | Soul is author of all of life, and of the stars, and it gives them law and movement [Plotinus] |
| 6917 | God is the essence of thought, abstracted from the thinker [Hegel, by Feuerbach] |
| 6915 | Hegel made the last attempt to restore Christianity, which philosophy had destroyed [Hegel, by Feuerbach] |
| 21811 | Even the soul is secondary to the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], of which soul is an utterance [Plotinus] |