168 ideas
| 12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
| 13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
| 12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
| 19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
| 12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
| 12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
| 13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
| 12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
| 15105 | F(x) walked into a bar. The barman said.. [Sommers,W] |
| 12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
| 4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
| 13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
| 13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
| 12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
| 12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
| 12408 | Sartre to Waitress: Coffee with no cream, please... [Sommers,W] |
| 12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
| 4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
| 4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
| 12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
| 12397 | Said Plato: 'The things that we feel... [Sommers,W] |
| 12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
| 12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
| 4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
| 4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
| 12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
| 12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
| 12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
| 12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
| 5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
| 12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
| 4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
| 12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
| 12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
| 12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
| 12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
| 12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
| 13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
| 13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
| 12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
| 4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
| 12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
| 11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
| 12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
| 12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
| 12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
| 12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
| 12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
| 12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
| 5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
| 12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
| 12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
| 12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
| 12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
| 12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
| 5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
| 12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
| 17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
| 12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
| 12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
| 4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
| 4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
| 4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
| 13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
| 12407 | Barman to Descartes: Would you like another drink?... [Sommers,W] |
| 12399 | There was a young student called Fred... [Sommers,W] |
| 12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
| 13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
| 20963 | A philosopher and his wife are out for a drive... [Sommers,W] |
| 12409 | The philosopher Berkeley once said.. [Sommers,W] |
| 12404 | Dear Sir, Your astonishment's odd.... [Sommers,W] |
| 12403 | There once was a man who said: 'God... [Sommers,W] |
| 12402 | ..But if he's a student of Berkeley... [Sommers,W] |
| 21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
| 12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
| 12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
| 12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
| 14694 | "My dog's got synaesthesia." How does he smell? ..... [Sommers,W] |
| 4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
| 19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
| 12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
| 4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
| 4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
| 4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
| 4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
| 13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
| 4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
| 4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
| 12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
| 4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
| 12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
| 13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
| 4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
| 12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
| 12401 | A toper who spies in the distance... [Sommers,W] |
| 5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
| 12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
| 5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
| 4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
| 12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
| 4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
| 4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
| 12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
| 19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
| 12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
| 12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
| 12410 | There once was a man who said 'Damn!... [Sommers,W] |
| 19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
| 4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 9392 | How do behaviourists greet each other? [Sommers,W] |
| 4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
| 4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
| 4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
| 4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
| 4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
| 4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
| 4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
| 4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
| 4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
| 12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
| 12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
| 12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
| 19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
| 4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
| 12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
| 12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
| 4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
| 4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
| 12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
| 12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
| 12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
| 12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
| 12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
| 12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
| 12405 | 'If you're aristocratic,' said Nietzsche... [Sommers,W] |
| 9391 | Why do anarchists drink herbal tea? [Sommers,W] |
| 12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
| 4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
| 4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
| 12400 | Cries the maid: 'You must marry me Hume!'... [Sommers,W] |
| 16527 | Causation - we all thought we knew it/ Till Hume came along and saw through it/…. [Sommers,W] |
| 11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
| 12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
| 12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
| 12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
| 12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
| 17592 | The barman called 'Time!', and Augustine said..... [Sommers,W] |
| 12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
| 15208 | The past, present and future walked into a bar.... [Sommers,W] |
| 12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
| 12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
| 1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
| 21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
| 19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
| 4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
| 5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |