70 ideas
| 9672 | Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G] |
| 9697 | X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G] |
| 9685 | <a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G] |
| 9675 | a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G] |
| 9674 | {x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G] |
| 9673 | {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G] |
| 9677 | Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G] |
| 9676 | {a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G] |
| 9679 | X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
| 9678 | X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
| 9681 | X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G] |
| 9683 | X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G] |
| 9682 | X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G] |
| 9684 | Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G] |
| 9694 | The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G] |
| 9693 | The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G] |
| 9692 | The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G] |
| 9698 | The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G] |
| 9688 | A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G] |
| 9687 | A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G] |
| 9695 | An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G] |
| 9696 | A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G] |
| 9686 | A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G] |
| 9689 | The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G] |
| 9690 | A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G] |
| 9691 | A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G] |
| 9680 | The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G] |
| 4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
| 4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
| 4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
| 4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
| 4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
| 14296 | Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine] |
| 4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
| 4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
| 4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
| 4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
| 4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
| 4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
| 4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
| 4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
| 4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
| 4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
| 4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
| 4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
| 4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
| 4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
| 4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
| 4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
| 4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
| 4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
| 4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
| 4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
| 4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
| 4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
| 4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
| 4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
| 4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
| 4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
| 4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
| 4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
| 4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
| 4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
| 4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |