Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Evidence', 'Identity and Existence in Logic' and 'The Central Questions of Philosophy'

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32 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
5331 You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
18767 Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
18763 Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
18771 Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
18769 Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
18770 We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
2611 It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18768 We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]
18766 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
18765 Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
16520 We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
18764 The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19682 Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
19687 Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
19684 Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
19688 Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
19686 Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
19680 Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
19681 If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
19689 Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19683 Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
19685 Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
2613 The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
5328 Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
5330 Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
5325 Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
5326 Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5324 Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
5322 Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
5327 Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5329 Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
2610 Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]