24 ideas
14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
10163 | Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman] |
10760 | With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Kripke, by Rossberg] |
16189 | The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Kripke, by Simchen] |
15132 | The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Kripke, by Williamson] |
14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |
19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |
14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |