Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Evidence', 'The Concept of Mind' and 'Metaphysics: a very short introduction'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
18005 Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
14297 A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
14300 No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
18617 Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
18618 Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford]
18619 Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford]
18620 Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19682 Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
19687 Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
19684 Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
19688 Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
19686 Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
19680 Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
19681 If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
19689 Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19683 Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
19685 Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
2622 Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
1354 We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
1353 Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2624 I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
2620 Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2388 Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
3354 You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2387 How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]