23 ideas
19115 | You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli] |
19119 | We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli] |
19111 | Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli] |
19114 | Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli] |
19113 | Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli] |
19116 | Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli] |
19117 | We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli] |
19118 | People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli] |
19110 | In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli] |
19112 | Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli] |
19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |
19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |
10645 | We reach concepts by clarification, or by definition, or by habitual experience [Price,HH] |
10644 | A 'felt familiarity' with universals is more primitive than abstraction [Price,HH] |
10646 | Our understanding of 'dog' or 'house' arises from a repeated experience of concomitances [Price,HH] |