Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Evidence', 'Ontological Dependence' and 'De Veritate (On Truth)'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
14255 We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
14250 Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
14259 Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
4748 Anselm of Canterbury identified truth with God [Anselm, by Engel]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
14253 An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
14251 A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K]
14254 Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K]
14257 An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K]
14261 There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
14252 We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14256 How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
14258 Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
14260 An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19682 Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
19687 Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
19684 Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
19688 Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
19686 Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
19680 Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
19681 If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
19689 Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19683 Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
19685 Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew]