16 ideas
| 13949 | All models of Peano axioms are isomorphic, so the models all seem equally good for natural numbers [Cartwright,R on Peano] |
| 18113 | PA concerns any entities which satisfy the axioms [Peano, by Bostock] |
| 17634 | Peano axioms not only support arithmetic, but are also fairly obvious [Peano, by Russell] |
| 15653 | We can add Reflexion Principles to Peano Arithmetic, which assert its consistency or soundness [Halbach on Peano] |
| 17635 | Arithmetic can have even simpler logical premises than the Peano Axioms [Russell on Peano] |
| 13166 | Essences are no use in mathematics, if all mathematical truths are necessary [Mancosu] |
| 19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
| 19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
| 19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
| 19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
| 19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
| 19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
| 19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
| 19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |
| 19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
| 19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |