17 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
6343 | For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |
7293 | It is legitimate to do harm if it is the unintended side-effect of an effort to achieve a good [Grayling] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
7292 | War must also have a good chance of success, and be waged with moderation [Grayling] |