Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Knowledge First (and reply)', 'Philosophy of Language' and 'A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
15547 Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
7306 If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
15542 All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19527 We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson]
19528 Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson]
19529 Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson]
19530 A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson]
19531 Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson]
19536 Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
19526 Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
7322 Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7325 Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
7324 Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
19534 How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson]
19535 Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson]
19533 Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7323 If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
19532 Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
7315 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
7328 The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
7329 Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
7333 The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]