8 ideas
9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
3284 | There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel] |