Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', 'Actualism and Possible Worlds' and 'Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue'

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49 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant]
All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant]
Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant]
The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant]
If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant]
Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant]
Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant]
Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant]
Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant]
We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant]
Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant]
Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant]