Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Necessary Existents', 'Why Propositions cannot be concrete' and 'Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)'

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10 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga]
Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]