15 ideas
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
7566 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley] |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |