Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom', 'Consistency and realism (with 1972 note)' and 'works'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


13 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner]
The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]