31 ideas
23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
2181 | It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B] |
2176 | There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B] |
23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
4317 | We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham] |
23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
2174 | Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B] |
2178 | In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B] |
23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
2169 | Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B] |
2172 | The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B] |
2179 | If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B] |
2180 | If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B] |
2175 | There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B] |