25 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
2676 | Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle] |
2675 | Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle] |
2677 | Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction [Aristotle] |
2674 | Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition [Aristotle] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
16967 | 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
16149 | Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle] |
11840 | Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |