36 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
21918 | Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
21920 | No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
21362 | Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
21361 | For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
21919 | Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
21917 | The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
21921 | Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |
21363 | Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |