35 ideas
21584 | A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell] |
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
21572 | Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell] |
21571 | Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell] |
21574 | Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell] |
21587 | Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell] |
21582 | Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell] |
21573 | When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
18201 | General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C] |
21684 | Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
22316 | A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
21576 | With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell] |
21575 | When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
21579 | Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell] |
21578 | Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell] |
6416 | Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
21581 | We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell] |