60 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |