Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', 'A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori' and 'The Nature of Rationality'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
9593 Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
22664 I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
9594 Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
22665 Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
9358 There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9357 Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9364 Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
9601 The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9599 There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9602 Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9362 Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
9598 Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16536 Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
9596 We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9597 There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9365 We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9592 Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
20181 When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
22662 In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick]
22666 Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick]
22667 Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick]
22663 Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9361 We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
9595 You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
9600 If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
9363 Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]