37 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
17729 | Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins] |
17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
17620 | Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy] |
17605 | Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy] |
17625 | If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy] |
17730 | Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins] |
17615 | Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy] |
17618 | Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy] |
17719 | Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins] |
17717 | Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins] |
17614 | The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy] |
17724 | It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins] |
17727 | We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins] |
17720 | There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
17728 | The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
17726 | Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
17734 | It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins] |
17723 | Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins] |
17718 | Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins] |
17739 | The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins] |
17731 | Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
17732 | Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins] |
17725 | 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |