Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', 'Abstract Entities' and 'Introduction to 'Self-Knowledge''

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
9593 Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
9594 Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
14592 Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
14594 Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
9601 The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9599 There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
14595 Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
14593 Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9602 Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
9598 Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16536 Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
9596 We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9597 There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9592 Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
20181 When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5673 If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5670 Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
5671 Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam]
5672 Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam]
5675 Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5674 We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
9595 You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
9600 If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]