50 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |