26 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
15391 | A substance is, roughly, a basic being or subject at the foundation of reality [Robb] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
15392 | If an object survives the loss of a part, complex objects can have autonomy over their parts [Robb] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |