Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects'', 'Truth Rehabilitated' and 'The Reasons of Love'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]