Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects'', 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good' and 'works'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
21970 Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
9184 We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
6912 For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
9183 Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
21973 Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW]
21914 We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
20951 The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie]
21964 Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte]
21968 Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
21965 Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
6248 Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6238 We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
6239 We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
6240 The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
6242 We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
6247 Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
6244 Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
6243 As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6246 My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
6241 Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
6245 That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
6251 The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
6250 We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
6249 If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]