21 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
7844 | The Golden Rule is accepted everywhere, and gives a fixed target for morality [Voltaire] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |