Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', 'Proof of an External World' and 'Axiomatic Thought'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

20 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
9593 Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
9594 Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17963 The facts of geometry, arithmetic or statics order themselves into theories [Hilbert]
17966 Axioms must reveal their dependence (or not), and must be consistent [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
17967 To decide some questions, we must study the essence of mathematical proof itself [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
17965 The whole of Euclidean geometry derives from a basic equation and transformations [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17964 Number theory just needs calculation laws and rules for integers [Hilbert]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
9601 The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9599 There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9602 Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
9598 Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16536 Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
9596 We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
6349 I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9597 There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9592 Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
20181 When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
9595 You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
9600 If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
17968 By digging deeper into the axioms we approach the essence of sciences, and unity of knowedge [Hilbert]