38 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
7798 | There are three axiom schemas for propositional logic [Girle] |
7786 | Propositional logic handles negation, disjunction, conjunction; predicate logic adds quantifiers, predicates, relations [Girle] |
7799 | Proposition logic has definitions for its three operators: or, and, and identical [Girle] |
7797 | Axiom systems of logic contain axioms, inference rules, and definitions of proof and theorems [Girle] |
7794 | There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle] |
7793 | ◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle] |
7795 | S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle] |
7787 | Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle] |
7796 | Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle] |
7788 | Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle] |
10482 | The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos] |
10492 | A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos] |
10485 | Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos] |
10484 | The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos] |
7789 | Necessary implication is called 'strict implication'; if successful, it is called 'entailment' [Girle] |
7790 | If an argument is invalid, a truth tree will indicate a counter-example [Girle] |
10491 | Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos] |
10483 | Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos] |
10490 | Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
10487 | I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos] |
10489 | We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
7800 | Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle] |
7801 | Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
7792 | A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |