13 ideas
| 19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
| 19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
| 19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| 19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |