Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', 'Reply to Foucher' and 'An Outline of Philosophy'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
9593 Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
9594 Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
19406 I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
9601 The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9599 There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9602 Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
9598 Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16536 Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
9596 We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9597 There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9592 Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
20181 When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
9595 You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
21740 I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
21741 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
21746 Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
21747 Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
21743 In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
21742 Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
21745 Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
9600 If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
21744 Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
22891 We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon]