10 ideas
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| 6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
| 6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
| 6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
| 6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
| 6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |