Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom', 'New System and Explanation of New System' and 'Philosophical Naturalism'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz]