28 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
5040 | Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
13159 | Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
5039 | If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
9144 | Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10141 | Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K] |
10135 | We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K] |
9142 | Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10137 | Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K] |
10138 | An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
5041 | God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz] |