28 ideas
| 9764 | Inspiration and social improvement need wisdom, but not professional philosophy [Quine] |
| 9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
| 9763 | For a good theory of the world, we must focus on our flabby foundational vocabulary [Quine] |
| 12780 | We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz] |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| 12774 | Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz] |
| 12782 | Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz] |
| 12777 | Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz] |
| 9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
| 9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
| 12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
| 12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
| 12775 | Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz] |
| 12776 | Every substance is alive [Leibniz] |
| 9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
| 12753 | A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz] |
| 12781 | A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz] |
| 12779 | There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz] |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| 16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
| 9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
| 9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
| 20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
| 12785 | Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz] |
| 9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
| 9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
| 12784 | Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz] |